This paper investigates the effects of employment protection legislation on the rates of hiring, separation, worker flows, job reallocation, and churning flows for the case of Taiwan. Our empirical identification takes advantage of a reform created by Taiwan's enactment of Labor Standards Law, which has substantially increased the costs of firing, and the implementation of the law's enforcement measures. Moreover, our identification also exploits the fact that the stringency of the law's provisions and the intensity of the law's enforcement vary with establishment size. Based on monthly data at the establishment level for the period 1983-1995, we find that Taiwan's Labor Standards Law and its enforcement measures have dampened labor turnover for mediumsized and large establishments, while that of small establishments was not affected.
Introduction
This paper studies the effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) on the rates of hiring, separation, worker flows, job reallocation, and churning flows. EPL refers to restrictions on firing by means of severance pay, mandatory notification periods, or other administrative procedures that delay or prevent an employee from being dismissed. We examine the case of Taiwan, whose enactment of Labor Standards Law in 1984 and its subsequent enforcement measures substantially increase firms' firing costs.
The economic consequences of EPL is an important public policy issue. The original purpose of EPL is to enhance the welfare of employees. However, if EPL leads to a lower employment level, it becomes questionable whether the protections that employees enjoy through EPL are worth the costs in terms of fewer employment opportunities.
Policy makers have to weigh the welfare gains from labor protections against the loss (i.e., a lower employment level). Furthermore, if a country's EPL is associated with slower worker and job flows, diminished economic efficiency and productivity are the extra costs that the society has to pay for the improvement in employees' job security.
Slower worker and job flows imply that the adjustment of the economy to shocks will be slower and resources are not allocated to their best use. 1 Economic theories generally predict that EPL limits the reallocation of labor (e.g., Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993) . EPL lowers worker and job flows because firing costs discourage firms from firing and hiring. In the absence of EPL a firm dismisses a nonperforming employee, and hires an employee to replace a non-performing one or to expand its workforce. The presence of EPL prompts a firm to retain an employee even if her marginal value product is below wages in order to avoid the EPL-associated firing costs. Likewise, a firm may be discouraged from hiring even when the product market calls for an output expansion because an extra employee increase the chance of costly adjustments in the future when the product market takes a down turn. The negative effects of EPL on firms' firing and hiring lead to lower labor market velocity. In contrast to the consensus on the predicted effects of EPL on the flows of workers and jobs, there is an inconsonance in the expected employment consequences of EPL among economic models with different behavioral and environmental assumptions.
costs have substantially increased with its enactment. Moreover, to enhance its enforcement, institutional changes were implemented in 1987 (i.e., the setting up of the Council of Labor Affairs) and 1993 (i.e., the enactment of the Labor Inspection Law). However, the intensity of LSL's enforcement are uniform across establishments of different sizes. This is because smaller establishments (having less than 30 employees) are not required to post work rules such that monitoring of compliance for these establishments is more difficult. Also, due to insufficient workforce, inspection for compliance is less intensive for smaller establishments. For our identification of the effect of EPL on labor turnover, we rely on special features of Taiwan's institution for labor protection and the changes in this institution, i.e., (a) the existence of a control group, i.e., some industries (mainly in the tertiary sector) were not covered by LSL until 1996, (b) the changes in the intensity of LSL's enforcement over time due to the implementation of enforcement measures (i.e., the Council of Labor Affairs and the Labor Inspection Law), and (c) the variation in the stringency of LSL's provisions and intensity of its enforcement with establishment size. 2 LSL's special features and its subsequent enforcement measures allow us to adopt the triple-difference (i.e., difference-in-difference-in-difference) approach for identification.
Our estimation is based on monthly data from the Employees' Earnings Surveys, which is conducted by Taiwan's government for administrative and policy purposes. Establishments are sampled by a stratified sampling scheme, where stratification is based on establishment size. Our sample, which has about one million observations, consists of a sequence of establishment-level cross-sections covering the period 1983-1995. An advantage of our data is that they are at the monthly frequency. This enables us to uncover the effect of employment protection on worker and job flows that may not be possible using data of lower frequencies. This point is demonstrated by Blanchard and Portugal's (2001) finding that the effect of employment protection in Portugal affects mainly the transitory component of job creation and job destruction as reflected in their quarter-to-quarter movements, while the permanent one, as captured by year-to-year movements, is largely unaffected. This is also supported by Wolfers' (2005) theoretical model and empirical findings.
In our empirical analysis, we examine estimates of difference-in-differences and triple-difference with respect to five turnover rates, i.e., the rates of hiring, separation, worker flows, job reallocation, and churning flows. The difference-in-difference 2 See Section 3 for details.
estimates pertain to the changes in the relative turnover rates between the treatment group (i.e., establishments covered by LSL) and control groups (i.e., establishments not covered). The triple-difference estimates pertains to (a) the changes in the differencein-difference estimates arising from the implementation of an enforcement measure; and (b) the difference in the difference-in-difference estimates between establishments of difference sizes (i.e., having below 29, 30-99, or 100 or more employees). These estimates are obtained by estimating a linear regression model, where we allow the labor turnover rates of the treatment group and control group to have different time trend.
We also allow establishment size to have a smooth effect on labor turnover. Thus, the effects of LSL and its subsequent enforcement measures are identified by the discontinuity surrounding an institutional change and an establishment size cutoff point.
Furthermore, in our estimation we use cell weights to account for the sized-stratified sampling of the Employees' Earnings Survey. With establishment size being a criterion for stratification, without accounting for the sampling scheme of the survey the estimation results are likely to be biased. This is because labor turnover rates may be a function establishment size. A cell weight pertains to the total number of establishments in a particular establishment size category and in a particular industry. We construct cell weights based on the Industry, Commerce, and Service Census.
Our empirical findings suggest that Taiwan's LSL and its enforcement measures do have negative impacts on labor turnover pertaining to medium-sized and large establishments. These negative effects also vary with establishment size. Relative to medium-sized establishments, large establishments endure greater negative impacts by LSL and its enforcement measures. However, the labor turnover rates pertaining to small establishments are not affected by the enactment of LSL and its enforcement measures.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. A review of literature is presented in Section 2. In section 3 we provide an overview of the evolution of EPL in Taiwan.
For our empirical analysis we use data from the Employees' Earnings Survey, which is described in Section 4. Our empirical strategy and discussion of estimation results are presented in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
Literature Review
In the literature, there is a large body of theoretical and empirical research evaluating EPL's economic effects. Among theoretical studies, it is generally agreed that EPL has a negative impact on job and worker flows. 3 Notable examples of these studies are Linbeck and Snower (1988), Bentolila and Bertola (1990) , Bertola (1990) , Bertola (1992) , Burda (1992) , Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) , Saint-Paul (1995) , Boeri (1999) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) , Fella (2000) , Pissarides' (2001) , Galdón-Sáchez and Güell (2003). 4 Even though theoretical studies unanimously agree on the negative effect of EPL on labor turnover, empirical findings are divided. For example, based on aggregate data Lazear (1990) and Bertola (1990) find that EPL does not have any effect on the employment level. By contrast, also using aggregate data Di Tella and Macculloch (2004) find that an increase in the degree of labor market flexibility is associated with an decrease in the unemployment rate and an increase in the labor force participation rate. 5 Findings of more recent studies based on micro data are no more consistent. Most previous studies in the literature use indicators of the strictness of EPL to measure firing costs and depend on cross-country comparison for identification. Adopting such a strategy may weaken identification because changes in firing costs in most countries are mostly marginal and cross-country comparison may be complicated by institutional differences (e.g., the rule of law and social norms, etc.) across countries.
There are recent empirical studies that use more robust identification strategies, e.g., Kugler's (1999 Kugler's ( , 2004 , Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003) , and Kugler and Pica (2005) .
They rely on institutional changes created by labor market reforms, which relax labor market regulations. In the context of the Colombian labor market reform, Kugler 3 See Ljungqvist (2002) for a explanation on the mixed theoretical results concerning the effects of EPL (especially lay-off costs). 4 An exception is Lazear (1990) , who demonstrates that in complete markets EPL does not have any real effect on the reallocation of workers because the effects of firing costs, which represents a transfer from an employer to an dismissed employee, will be neutralized by employment contracts, which specifies a reverse transfer. 5 Their studies do not contain an investigation on EPL's effect on labor market reallocations.
(1999) uses multi-year cross-sectional data at the individual level to investigates the impact of a firing costs reduction on the hazard of exiting from employment and from unemployment. The Kugler's (1999) difference-in-difference estimation uses formal sector employees and informal sector employees (which was exempted from the firing costs reduction), respectively, as the treatment and control groups.
To identify the effect of the 1997 relaxation of EPL in Spain, Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003) , use quarterly individual data and adopt a difference-in-difference approach with an individual's age as the criterion to classify sample individuals into control or treatment groups. The 1990 Italian labor market reform, which increases the firing costs for small firms, allows Kugler and Pica (2005) to identify the effects of EPL on job and worker flows. Employing a matched employer-employee panel and using large firms, which were not affected by the reform, as the control group, they use a difference-in-difference approach for estimation.
By exploiting institutional changes for identification, our study is similar to that of Kugler's (1999 Kugler's ( , 2004 , Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003) , and Kugler and Pica (2005) .
This study supplements these studies by providing additional evidence on the effects of changes in EPL in the context of an Asian country during a period of rapid economic development.
Background

Labor Standards Law (1984)
Taiwan's LSL was enacted on August 1, 1984. Prior to LSL there did not exist a comprehensive labor law, even though there was a multitude of labor laws in Taiwan. 6 Compared to the labor laws preceding LSL, LSL represents a significant strengthening of labor protection.
Firstly, LSL is comprehensive. Taiwan's LSL attempts to regulate all aspects of employment relationship, e.g., labor contract, wage, overtime payments and hours, retirement and severance payments, compensations for occupational accidents, maternity benefits. 7 Some of these were stipulated by other existing labor laws. For example, the 6 Among the pre-LSL labor laws in Taiwan, the major one was the Factory Act, which was enacted in 1930 and amended in 1975. 7 See Lai and Master (2005) for an analysis of the adverse effects of LSL's maternity and pregnancy benefit provisions on women's employment and wages in Taiwan.
Factory Act had provisions for overtime payments and hours, and maternity benefits; and severance payments was mandated also by the Factory Act. Some of the LSL labor protection measures were new, e.g., the prohibition of firing at will. Moreover, while many previous labor laws (e.g., the Factory Act) did not have any provisions for penalties for violations, violations of LSL are liable to fines and prison sentences.
Moreover, LSL has a much broader coverage then Taiwan's previous labor laws. For example, while the Factory Act only covers manufacturing firms with 30 or more employees, LSL covers employees in manufacturing and some other sectors, regardless of the number of employees in the establishments. 8 The industries covered by LSL include:
(1) agriculture, forestry, fishing and animal husbandry; (2) mining and quarrying; (3) manufacturing; (4) electricity, gas and water; (5) construction; (6) transportation, storage and communication; and (7) mass media. The industries not covered by LSL belong to the service sector: (1) retail and wholesale; (2) hotels and restaurants; (3) commerce; (4) finance, insurance and real estate; (5) business services; (6) social, personal and related community services; and (7) public administration. The existence of industries not covered by LSL is due to the fact that during LSL's gestation period, manufacturing was the largest sector in Taiwan. Moreover, limiting the coverage of LSL to a specific sector might reduce the costs (both political and economic) of its enactment and made it easier for the law to be endorsed by the congress.
The enactment of LSL has led to a substantial increase in the costs of firing an employee in several dimensions. Firstly, employers have to give an advance notice before dismissing an employee. How far in advance a notice has to be issued in order to dismiss an employee depends on the type of contracts and the length of service of the employee. For example, for an employee working under a non-fixed-term contract and having worked for more than three years, a 30-day advance notice has to be given in order for the employer to dismiss the employee. Secondly, LSL imposes a higher severance pay than previous labor laws. Although the Factory Act also stipulated severance pay for dismissed employees, it did not specify the amount and it allowed an employer to set its own severance pay as part of the work rules. 9 Under LSL a dismissed employee is 8 As of 1984, when the Factory Act was replaced by LSL, only 30% of all non-farm workers were covered by the Factory Act. The scope of Taiwan's LSL was extended further to cover employees in the service sector in 1996. 9 The Factory Act required employers employing more than 30 workers to post work rules. However, there were no provisions for penalties for violations. There are stricter stipulations for work rules under LSL. LSL requires an establishment of more than 30 employees to have work rules (covering, e.g., the entitled to one month's wage for each year of service for the whole length of the tenure.
Moreover, LSL raises an employer's costs of firing an employee by ruling out the possibility for an employee to be fired at will. Firing at will is prohibited even with advance notices. Under LSL an employer can dismiss an employee only if the business is closing down, suspended for more than one month, suffering from a loss, or when the employee is not able to perform the duties satisfactorily or violates the work rule.
Since LSL imposes substantial extra labor costs to employers, they have tried to evade it or adopted a wait-and-see strategy (see Chiu, 1993) . The poor enforcement of LSL has also contributed to the low compliance rate of LSL in the early years of its wan Provincial Government's local labor agencies took LSL seriously. As such LSL was poorly enforced and employers' compliance was skimpy. 10 In contrast to employers' lackluster compliance, employees believed they had the rights stipulated by LSL. This had led to a rise in labor-management confrontation and disputes.
The low compliant rate was especially serious for small establishments. This is because during this period labor inspection mainly aimed at medium-sized to large establishments. In addition, even though establishments employing less than 30 employees are also covered by LSL, without the requirement for the posting of work rules, the compliance of these smaller firms with LSL is difficult to monitor.
Council of Labor Affairs (1987)
compensation scheme, work schedule, and disciplinary measures, etc). After being sanctioned by the appropriate government authorities, a firm's work rules are to be posted publicly. There are also provisions for penalties for violation. 10 The Factory Act was similarly enforced. The poor enforcement of LSL and the Factory Act is attributable to the fact that the Ministry of the Interior, which was a weak ministry in the 80s, when national security and economic growth were the utmost concerns of Taiwan's government. Even though the Ministry of Interior was relatively more sympathetic to labor's right and believed that the implementation of LSL would promote workers' welfare, it is ineffective in the enforcement of LSL. Moreover, local labor agencies were prevented from seriously carrying out inspection and prosecution because of interference from local politicians, shortage of workforce, and poor training of inspectors.
In response to mounting social discontent and pressure from the U.S. to improve labor rights, Taiwan's government attempted to step up LSL's enforcement by setting up the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) on August 1, 1987 . The CLA is a government agency at the near-ministry level. It took charge of labor inspection. However, due to insufficient workforce, its labor inspection emphasized on establishments with 100 or more employees. It is reported by the CLA that in 1989, the CLA has inspected 2730 such establishments, representing 53.29% of these establishments. Almost half of these inspected establishments were either fined (43.6%) or sent to court (5.5%). 11, 12 In addition, the CLA was responsible for providing guidelines and consultation for local labor agencies, which were responsible for inspecting smaller establishments (i.e., with less than 100 employees). In 1989, 6156 (accounting for 3.11% of establishments employing less than 100 employees and covered by LSL) businesses were inspected. 13 Among these inspected 17.01% were either fined or sent to court. Comparing the inspection results of the central labor agency (i.e., the CLA) and the local ones, we see that the violation rates found by the local agencies were lower. This can be attributed to poor coordination among local agencies, insufficient training, interference by local business, who lobbied against inspection and penalties, and a lack of cooperation from justice agencies (see Chiu, 1993) . This suggests that the local labor agencies are less effective in performing their duties.
14 Also, the different inspection rates for establishment of different size reported above also suggest that the inspection intensity is higher for larger establishments.
Labor Inspection Law (1993)
To remedy the ineffective inspection of local labor agencies, the CLA drafted a Labor Inspection Law (LIL), which was promulgated on February 3, 1993. LIL provides labor inspection a legal basis and established a central inspection system. Under LIL, all inspection agencies are under the jurisdiction of the CLA. This gives the CLA the authority to supervise inspection agents and avoids interferences from local businesses.
In addition, labor inspection agencies' jurisdiction has been much expanded under 11 The figures on the number of inspections are from Council of Labor Affairs (1990) . Unfortunately, the rates of labor inspection for other years were not reported. 12 The mandatory penalty for an employer in violation of LSL is NT$30,000 at most. 13 These figures are from the Council of Labor Affairs (1990). 14 It is also possible, but unlikely, that this is because smaller firms had higher compliance rates with LSL. 
Sample Design
The targeted sample size for each survey is 8,000. All government-owned enterprises are surveyed, and data collection is by means of on-site enumeration. For the rest of the establishments, a random sample is surveyed by mail. 16 The sampling of these establishments are by means of a stratified random sampling approach, with stratification by an establishment's number of employees. The EES uses the Dalenius-Hodges method to determine the boundaries of the strata. 17 The Neyman allocation is used to determine the sample size in each stratum.
Since the rate of labor turnover may vary with establishment size, estimates or statistics generated without accounting for sampling stratification may be biased. To In the reports the number of establishments by industry and establishment size are reported.
18
For the off years, the number of establishments in each cell is imputed by interpolation. The weight, denoted w it , for establishment i, which belongs to size category l and industry k, and observed in year t, equals the number of establishments in that size-industry cell in year t.
Sampling Frame
The sampling frame of the EES comes from (1) business taxation registry; (2) Industry, Commerce and Service Census (conducted every 5 years); and (3) other administrative records and business registration records. Since the sampling frame is updated based on administrative records, the EES is able to cover newborn establishments, albeit with some time lags.
Sample Selection
The 1983 -1995 EES raw data consists 1,286,324 observations. The following de-scribes our sample selection.
1. A total of 1,215 observations pertaining to establishments without employees are deleted.
2. We drop observations pertaining to establishments belonging to public-enterprises, which include public utilities (e.g., electricity, gas, and water) and other governmentowned enterprises, and the banking and insurance sector. We also drop petroleum refineries and related establishments, and mining establishments. We exclude establishments belonging to the banking and insurance sector because all banks and insurance companies were government-owned or controlled before the financial sector liberalization in 1991. During our sample period there was only one oil refinery which was owned and operated by Taiwan's government such that the oil refinery and petroleum distribution establishments are excluded from your sample. We exclude mining and quarrying establishments because that industry in Taiwan was highly controlled by the government. A total of 51,977 observations are dropped from the sample.
3. We delete 14,3061 observations which pertains to the three months before and after the implementation of each LSL-related policy. The dropping of observations pertaining to the three months after the implementation of an LSL-related policy is to allow an adjustment period for labor turnover to stabilize after the implementation of a labor protection policy. Moreover, the enactment of an LSL-related policy is likely to have been expected because the passage of a law usually involves a long process of negotiation among interest groups. The dropping of observations pertaining to the three months prior to the enactment of a law or policy is to minimize the confounding of our empirical results by firms' adjustment behavior prior to the actual enactment of the law.
4. In addition, we delete observations if any of the labor turnover rates is above the 99% percentile or below the 1% percentile of its distribution. There are 22,044 such observations.
After the above sample selection, our sample consists 1,080,165 observations.
Definition of Variables of Interest
The purpose of the current study is to identify the effect of Taiwan's LSL and the subsequent enhancement in its enforcement on the rates of hiring (denoted by HRATE), separation (denoted by SRATE), worker flows (denoted by WFLOW), job reallocation (denoted by JREALLOC), and churning flows (denoted by CFLOW).
These terms are defined as follows (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992 ; and Burgess, Lane, and Stevens, 2000). The rate of hiring is defined as the total entry (i.e., recalls and hiring of new employees) into the workforce of an establishment as a percentage of its total employment in the previous period. That is,
where HIRE it denotes total hiring during period t, and EMP it−1 equals the number of employees at the end of period t − 1. Similarly, the rate of separation is defined as the total number of employees departing (i.e., quits, layoffs, and firing) from an establishment as a percentage of its total employment in the previous period.
where SEPARATE it denotes total number of separation.
Worker flows measures all movements of workers (i.e., separation and hiring) of an establishment. It is equal to the summation of the number of workers who was hired and separated from establishment i during period t. To derive the rate of worker flows,
we divide an establishment's worker flows by the number of employees at the end period t − 1, i.e.,
The variation in worker reallocation arises from two sources. The first is due to a firm's creation and destruction of job positions as it expands or contracts, leading to changes in the level of employment. These changes of job positions are called gross job reallocation or job turnover. The second source of turnover is a result of worker movements in a given job position. These movements may either arise from worker-initiated quit or from firm-initiated firing. Arising from poor job matches, they have no effects on the level of a firm's employment positions.
Job reallocation refers to the absolute value of the change in employment, which is equivalent to the gross changes of job creation and job destruction. The rate of job reallocation is derived by dividing job reallocation during period t by the employment level at the end of period t − 1. That is,
where JC it and JD it , respectively, stand for the number of jobs created and destructed during period t. It is obvious from (4) that WFLOW it must be greater or equal to
Churning flow is defined as worker flows in excess of job flows. The rate of churning flows is computed as
It represents the difference between the rates of worker flows and job reallocation. Since small establishment in the non-LSL-covered industries all the turnover rates are very stable over time. This is also confirmed by the average turnover rates reported in Table 3 . 19 In all the graphs, month effects are removed by regressing the turnover rates on 12 month dummies (with weights and without a constant term), and month effect adjusted turnover rates are obtained by adding the average of the 12 coefficients of the month dummies back to the residuals of these regressions. The figures in Table 3 -4 are weighted averages and month effects are not accounted for.
[ Table 4 here] The relative turnover rates, constructed by subtracting the average turnover rates of the LSL-covered industries by those of the non-covered industries, in Table 4 , and Figures 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 show that for small establishments there is a slight increase in relative labor turnover over time. Thus, the time series pattern of the labor turnover rates suggests that LSL and its enforcement measures did not have any hampering effect on small establishments' labor turnover.
By contrast, the five turnover rates of medium-sized and large establishments in the LSL-covered industries exhibit an obvious downward trend, while those pertaining to their counterparts in the non-LSL-covered industries show an upward trend. For medium-sized and large establishments belonging to the LSL-covered industries, their labor turnover rates during the pre-LSL period are slightly lower than those pertaining to the period immediately after the enactment of LSL (i.e., before the setting up of the CLA). Their turnover rates exhibit a distinct downward trend after 1987, when the CLA was set up. Their turnover rates decline further after 1993, when LIL was enacted. Conversely, for medium-sized and large establishments belonging to the non-LSL-covered industries, there is an upward trend. The negative effect of LSL and its enforcement measures on medium-sized and large establishments' turnover rates is sharply delineated by the downward trend in the relative turnover rates displayed in Table 4 , and Tables 3-4 indicate that while the turnover rates of small establishments were not affected by the enactment and enforcement measures of LSL, medium-sized and large establishments' turnover rates had clear dips, especially after the setting up of the CLA.
Empirical Strategy and Results
To investigate the effects of LSL and its subsequent enforcement measures on labor market dynamics, as measured by the rates of hiring, separation, worker flows, job reallocation, and churning flows, we use the difference-in-different-in-difference approach.
Our empirical strategy exploits the (a) changes in the strength in employment protection over time (i.e., the enactment of LSL in August 1984, the setting up of CLA in August 1987, and the enactment of LIL in February 1993), (b) sectoral difference in the coverage of EPL (i.e., Taiwan's LSL covered only some industries, which belong to the primary and secondary sectors of industry, and establishments in some industries, which mostly belong to the tertiary sector of industry, are not covered by LSL and are used as the control group), 20 and (c) differences in LSL enforcement intensity for LSLcovered establishments of difference sizes. 21 Accordingly, our empirical model is specified as follows.
where
, and CFLOW it ( f = 5), respectively, for establishment i in period t, COVERED it is an indicator of whether or not an establishment is in an industry covered by LSL; LSL it is an LSL indicator, which equals one, for the period August 1984-July 1987 (i.e, after the enactment of LSL and before the setting up of CLA); CLA it is a CLA indicator, which equals one for the period August 1988-January 1993 (i.e., after the setting up of CLA and before the enactment of LIL); LIL it is a post-LIL indicator, which equals one for periods after February 1993 (i.e., after the enactment of LIL); x it is a row vector of control variables; and it is a residual term. All the β's, as represented by the vector δ, are parameters to be estimated. Detailed definitions of variables used in our empirical analysis are listed in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 here] 20 More specifically, in our empirical analysis the covered industries include (1) manufacturing, (2) electricity, gas and water, (3) construction, and (4) transportation, storage and communications; and the industries not covered by LSL includes (1) trading, (2) wholesale, retail, traveler accommodation, and eating & drinking places, (3) finance and insurance (where banking and insurance establishments are excluded), (4) real estate, and rental & leasing services, (5) professional, scientific and technical services, (6) health care and social welfare services, (7) cultural, sports, and entertainment & recreation services; and (8) other services. 21 Smaller establishments' LSL compliance was loosely enforced. As mentioned in Section 3, LSL requires work rules to be posted by establishments with more than 30 employees and labor inspection mainly emphasizes establishments with more than 100 employees.
It is noted that the vector of control variables x it consists of (a) industry specific average wage (deflated by CPI), which are interacted with a set of industry dummies; (b) a polynomial (up to the fourth order) of establishment size; (c) a polynomial (up to the fourth order) of time trend; (d) interaction between dummies {SIZE30,SIZE100} and establishment size; (e) interaction between dummies {SIZE30,SIZE100} and time trend; (f) sector dummies; (g) the interaction between a sector dummy indicating LSL-covered industries COVERED and establishment size; and (h) a set of eleven month dummies. 22 The use of industry specific average wage as regressors in (6) is to account for the fact that different industries face different market conditions, which may affect its labor turnover rates. 23 Moreover, in (6) To account for size-stratified sampling of the EES, we estimate the coefficients δ f with sample weights. 24 That is, we weight an observation pertaining to establishment i in year t by w it , where w it represents the number of establishments in the sizeindustry cell that it belonged to in year t, and the coefficients are estimated via
Baseline Estimation
The estimation of the parameters in (6) is by means of weighted least squares. Our inference relies on cluster-robust standard errors, which account for within-group (i.e., industry) serial correlation of the error term it . 25 Our parameters of interest are 22 Qualitatively the estimation results and our conclusion remain the same as we increase or decrease the order of the establishment size polynomial. 23 Data on industry average wages are extracted from Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2008, which is published by Taiwan's Council for Economic Planning and Development. Electronic versions are available at http://www.cepd.gov.tw. 24 See Section 4 for an explanation on the construction of w it . 25 According to Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), the cluster-robust standard errors perform well. The cluster-robust standard errors are produced by using the cluster command in STATA, with the industries as the clusters. There are 12 industries in our sample. The t-statistics have 11 (i.e., the number clusters minus one) degrees of freedom instead of the total number of observation minus one due to the use of cluster-robust standard errors. The critical values in terms of the absolute values of the t-statistics
, which are the difference-in-differences of the labor turnover rates for the LSL-covered vs. non-LSL-covered establishments. We also compute triple-difference estimates, which pertain to the relative effects of different LSL-related policies and the relative effect of each LSL-related policy on establishments of different sizes, based on differences among these parameters. The estimation results are reported in Table 5 -8. 26 [ Table 5 here]
The parameters β f 15 , β f 16 , β f 17 , whose estimates are reported in Table 5 , represent the effects of LSL and the subsequent enforcement measures on the worker/job turnover rates during the periods August 1984-July 1987 (i.e., after LSL was enacted, but prior to the CLA's establishment), August 1987-January 1993 (i.e., after the CLA was set up, but prior to the enactment of LIL) and February 1993-December 1995 (i.e., after the enactment of LIL, until the end of our sample period), respectively, for establishments with less than 30 employees. 27 It is expected that all three parameters are negative. However, contrary to our conjecture, the estimates of spectively, for the five turnover rates. These F-statistics indicate that the differences in at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels are 1.796, 2.201, and 3.108, respectively. See also Wooldridge (2003) . 26 The full results are reported in the Appendix's Table A1 . 27 In the discussion below we refer to the three periods as the LSL, CLA, and LIL periods, while the period before the enactment of LSL as the pre-LSL period. these turnover rates are statistically insignificant except for that pertaining to churning flows.
The differences in parameter estimates β f 17 − β f 16 indicate the enforcement effect of the LIL on worker/job turnover rates of small establishments. According to our estimation results in Table 5 counterparts during the LSL, CLA, and LIL periods, respectively. According to Table 6, the rates of hiring, separation, worker flows, job reallocation, and churning flows for the LSL-covered medium-sized establishment relative to their non-covered counterparts decreased by {0.58%, 0.27%, 0.84%, 0.57%, 0.27%}, {1.26%, 1.36%, 2.61%, 1.52%, 1.09%}, and {2.48%, 2.68%, 5.16%, 2.79%, 2.37%}, respectively, during the LSL, CLA, and LIL periods relative to those in the pre-LSL period. Almost all of these differencein-difference estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. 28 These differencein-difference estimates are also significant in magnitude relative to the sample mean of the five turnover rates reported in Table 3 . These estimation results imply that Taiwan's Labor standards Law has a discernible dampening effect on the rates of labor turnover for medium-sized establishments.
[ Table 6 The difference-in-difference estimators β f 21 , β f 22 , β f 23 pertain to the worker/job turnover rates of the large establishments (i.e., 100 or more employees), relative to their counterparts not covered by LSL, during the LSL, CLA, and LIL periods. The parameter estimates reported in Table 7 suggest that the reductions in turnover rates during the LSL, CLA, and LIL periods are sizable relative to the sample mean of the five turnover rates. 30 While β f 21 is statistically significant only for the rate of hiring, β f 22 and β f 23 are statistically significant for almost all turnover rates. This suggests that the negative effect of LSL on large establishments' labor turnover started to emerge only when the CLA was set up and aggravated after LIL was enacted. This may reflect large establishments' ability to interfere with LSL's enforcement initially when the LSL was enacted.
[ Table 7 here]
To investigate the relative impacts of LSL, the CLA and LIL, we analyze the differences in the estimates of these three parameters and report the results in Table 7 . We (during the LIL period). They represent the impacts of LSL, the CLA, and LIL on the labor turnover rates for medium-sized establishments relative to those for small establishments. Since LSL's provisions and enforcement are more stringent for medium-sized establishments than small ones, it is expected that these differences in parameters are negative for the rates of labor turnover.
[ Table 8 here]
As reported in Table 8 triple-difference estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level and a majority of them are significant at the 5% level. 31 This suggests that the negative impacts of LSL, the CLA, and LIL are greater for medium-sized establishments than their smaller counterparts. Overall, these results lend support to our conjecture that Taiwan's Labor Standards Law and its subsequent enforcement measures did have greater negative impacts on labor turnover rates for medium-sized establishments than for small establishments.
Higher priority of the enforcement of LSL is placed on larger establishments (i.e., with 100 or more employees) such that LSL, the CLA, and LIL are expected to pose a greater impediment to labor force adjustment for this kind of establishments than their medium-sized counterparts. We confront this conjecture with empirical evidence by examining the estimates of the following triple-differences:
and β f 23 −β f 20 , which pertain to the difference in LSL, the CLA and LIL's impact on the labor turnover rate for larger establishments relative to the medium-sized ones.
It turns out that the triple-difference estimates, as reported in Table 8 , are mixed in sign and small in magnitude. The F-statistics of these triple-difference estimates imply that the relative impact of LSL and LIL on the rates of hiring, separation, worker flows, job reallocation, and churning flows are all statistically insignificant; while the relative impact of CLA on these rates are almost all statistically insignificant except for the estimate pertaining to the rate of separation, which is positive and is marginally significant (at the 10%). Thus, our conjecture is not supported by our empirical evidence. Our results suggest that LSL and its subsequent enforcement measures did not have greater impact on the labor turnover rates of large relative to medium-sized establishments.
This may be attributed to the fact that both medium-sized and large establishments are required to post work rules, which are quite effective in ensuring the compliance of these establishments.
Accounting for LSL's Effect on Establishment Size
The identification of the effects of LSL and its subsequent enforcement measures in (6) requires that establishment size is exogenous. However, establishments might have incentive to reduce their number of employees in order to minimize the burden imposed by LSL, implying an increase in the rate of separation. This is especially so for 31 The estimates for β f 18 − β f 15 for the rates of separation, job reallocation, and churning flows are statistically insignificant at the 10% level. The rest of the estimates are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. establishments whose number of employees was only slightly above 1, 30, or 100 before LSL and the introduction of the enforcement measures. Moreover, for establishments having no employees (e.g., the self-employed), or having slightly less than 30 or 100 employees, they may be discouraged from expanding their number of employees. Thus, the association between the degree of enforcement of LSL and establishment size may generate a correlation between the rates of labor turnover for firms with the number of employees in the neighborhood of 1, 30 and 100. This renders establishment size an invalid running variable in our empirical model.
To account for this, one may adopt an instrumental variable approach. This requires the use of variables, which generate variation in establishment size but have no direct relationship with labor turnover. However, such variables are not available in the EES data. Instead, we extenuate such bias by dropping establishments having 1-2, 24-36 and 80-120 employees when estimating model (6) . 32 This is a robustness check of our results in Tables 5-8 . The full results of this estimation is reported in the Appendix's Table A2 . These results suggests that the dropping of observations in the neighborhood of the cutoffs 1, 30, and 100 does not alter the pattern of the results.
Estimation Based on Six-Month Windows
In our baseline estimation of model (6), after dropping observations pertaining to the three months before and after a law/policy change, we use all observations to yield estimates of the impact of Taiwan's LSL and the subsequent enforcement measures. By doing so, unobserved confounding factors, which evolves over time, are not taken into account. A notable example of such confounding factor is a firm's production technology.
In response to a law/policy change a firm may adjust its production technology. Such adjustment is likely to be achieved slowly and this may induce an endogenous change in the structure of labor turnover in the long run. Moreover, structural changes in a firm's labor turnover pattern may be induced by technological innovations, which alter a firm's production technology.
The impact of these confounding factors may be minimized by confining our sample to narrow windows of observations surrounding a law/policy change. Accordingly, we estimate model (6) with observations falling into a six-month window surrounding a law/policy change. As in our baseline estimation, we drop observations pertaining to the three months immediately before and after a law/policy change. Thus, we use only the 4th-9th months' observations before and after the enactment of LSL, the setting up of the CLA, and the enactment of LIL.
To economize on space, we report only the full regression results, which are displayed in the Appendix's Table A3 . The triple-difference estimates are available upon request.
It turns out that the results based on observations in the six-month windows are similar to the baseline estimation results. This suggests that our baseline estimates are robust.
Conclusion
This study examines the effect of employment protection legislation on the labor turn- The conclusion that we draw from our study is that Taiwan's Labor Standards Law has suppressed medium-sized and large establishments' labor turnover, while those of small establishment was not affected. This supports theoretical prediction that the higher cost of firing due to employment protection legislation has made firms' adjustment in labor input more sluggish, implying that the allocation of resources may be less efficient. This suggests that there is hidden cost of labor protection, in the form of loss of economic efficiency. 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995 Relative rate of hiring for establishments employing less than 30 employees
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SRATE
The rate of separation, as defined in equation (2) . Its sample mean and standard deviation are 1.59% and 6.07, respectively.
WFLOW
The rate of worker flows, as defined in equation (3) . Its sample mean and standard deviation are 2.98% and 8.74, respectively.
JREALLOC
The rate of job reallocation, as defined in equation (4) . Its sample mean and standard deviation are 2.30% and 7.53, respectively.
CFLOW
The rate of churning flows, as defined in equation (5) Indicator of an individual's sector of employment, defined as COVERED it =1 if an establishment belongs to an LSL-covered industries, and COVERED it =0, otherwise.
It has a sample mean and standard deviation of 0.86 and 0.34, respectively.
SIZE30 it
Firm size indicator, defined as 
SIZE100 it
Firm size indicator, defined as SIZE100 it =1 if establishment i employs 100 or more employees, and SIZE100 it =0, otherwise.
Its sample mean and standard deviation are 0.30 and 0.46, respectively.
SIZE it
Number of employees in an establishment. Its sample mean and standard deviation are 151.76 and 682.56, respectively.
TREND t
The time trend. TREND t = 1 (January 1983), . . . , 156 (December 1995).
WAGE it
Average monthly wage (CPI deflated) of the industry, to which establishment i belongs, at the 1984 constant dollar. For "manufacturing", the mean and standard deviation are 26,312.43 and 10,825.85, respectively. For "construction" mean and standard deviation are 34,668.50 and 11,579.21, respectively. For "trading", its sample mean and standard deviation are 26,665.64 and 10,942.02, respectively. For "wholesale, retail, accommodation, and eating and drinking places", its sample mean and standard deviation are 16,158.33 and 6,528.87, respectively. For "transportation, storage and communications", its sample mean and standard deviation are 39,169.33 and 14,042.32, respectively. For "finance and insurance", its sample mean and standard deviation are 44,677.04 and 19,132.24, respectively. For "real estate and rental and leasing services", its sample mean and standard deviation are 36,531.55 and 13,148.82, respectively. For "professional, scientific and technical services", its sample mean and standard deviation are 43,750.95 and 14,180.43, respectively. For "health care services", its sample mean and standard deviation are 33,159.78 and 11,808.85, respectively. For "cultural, sporting and recreational services", its sample mean and standard deviation are 28,435.36 and 11,382.05, respectively. For "other services", its sample mean and standard deviation are 18,482.75 and 8,362.24, respectively. 
